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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Article VIII § 2 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3) (j) (1987 & Supp. 1990) and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did

the

trial

court

err

in ruling

that

summary

judgment was appropriate in this case since plaintiff could not
prove actual loss of income and earning capacity pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1986 & Supp. 1990)
On

appeal,

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

accords

no

deference to the trial court's legal conclusions in granting a
motion for summary judgment, but reviews them for correctness.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 246 (Utah 1988).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1986)(amended 1989 & 1990)
in part provides:
(1) Personal injury protection coverages
and benefits include:
. •«.

(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% of any
loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity per
person from inability to work, for a maximum of 52
consecutive weeks after the loss, except that this
1

benefit need not be paid for the first three days of
disability, unless the disability continues for longer
than two consecutive weeks after the date of injury;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case,

This is an appeal from the trial court's ruling that
plaintiff was not entitled to compensation for loss of income and
earning capacity under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307, where the
stipulated

facts

evidenced

that

Plaintiff

lost no

income or

earning capacity.

B.

Course and Disposition of Proceedings Below.

Plaintiff

filed suit against her insured, defendant

Guaranty, to recover PIP benefits for loss of income and earning
capacity, which benefits were refused.

On cross motions for

summary judgment the trial court ruled that plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits under the applicable statute since under the
stipulated facts she could not demonstrate both loss of gross
income and loss of earning capacity.

C.
1.

Statement of Relevant Undisputed Facts.

On the evening of February 1, 1989, the plaintiff,

Glenda Versluis, was in an automobile accident at 2500 South and
4000 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 21-22).
2

2.

The defendant, Guaranty National Insurance Company

("Guaranty"), was plaintiff's no-fault

insurance carrier. (R.

41).
3.

The day

following

the

accident, plaintiff

was

examined by Dr. Joseph Valley. (R. 21).
4.

On plaintiff's second visit to Dr. Valley, x-rays

were taken which showed no sign of injury.

Dr. Valley, however,

gave plaintiff a prescription for pain. (R. 21).
5.

At the end of February 1989, plaintiff saw her own

doctor, Dr. Dan Henry, who prescribed exercises.
6.

Plaintiff

(R. 21).

also saw a chiropractor in February,

1989, because neither the prescriptions nor the physical therapy
prescribed by the physicians seemed to help.

The chiropractor,

Dr. Jim Van Slooten, did not advise plaintiff not to work.

(R.

21) .
7.

Neither Dr. Henry nor Dr. Valley opined that the

injury would be permanent.
8.
However,

no

allegation.

Dr. Henry allegedly told plaintiff not to work.
written

subsequently

evidence

is

available

to

support

this

And, Dr. Henry did not give plaintiff a disability

or impairment rating.
9.

(R. 21).

Dr.

(R. 21).
Nathaniel

examined

Nord

plaintiff.
3

and

Dr.

While

Gordon
both

Kimball

physicians

characterized
neither

plaintiff's

advised

her not

impairment rating.
10.

as

soft

tissue

injuries,

to work nor issued a disability or

(R. 22).

Plaintiff was employed by Service Incorporated

from 1977 to 1979.
first child.

concerns

Plaintiff quit this job in 1979 to have her

Plaintiff was employed by Litton Industries between

1981 and 1983.

She quit this job to take care of her child and

because she did not get along with others at work and had a
misunderstanding

with

her

supervisor.

Plaintiff was briefly

employed by Central Valley Tire Inc. during 1985.
11.

(R. 22).

Between December 1985 and April 1986, plaintiff

was employed by John's Diesel.

Plaintiff was employed by Cencor

Temporary Services between June, 1986 and February, 1987.

(R.

22).
12.
March

and

plaintiff

Plaintiff received unemployment benefits between

May

of

began

1987.

receiving

Beginning
welfare

in

the

assistance

summer of 1987,
which

continued

through 1988, 1989, and at least until the day of plaintiff's
deposition on March 16, 1990.
13.

(R. 22-23).

Plaintiff had been unemployed for thirteen months

prior to the accident in question.
14.

(R. 42).

Plaintiff did not look for work in 1988 and only

looked for work during January of 1989.
4

(R. 42).

15.

Plaintiff worked at the Utah Auto Auction for two

days in early 1989.
16.

On

(R. 23).
February

15,

1990, plaintiff

filed

suit

against her insured, defendant Guaranty, to recover PIP benefits
for loss of income and earning capacity allegedly resulting from
the accident.
17.

(R. 3 ) .
The

parties

filed

cross

motions

for

Summary

Judgment. (R. 18, 34).
18.

In both her Memorandum in Support of her Motion

for Summary Judgment and in her Memorandum

in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff failed to cite
the trial court to any evidence, or even any reference in the
record, supporting the allegation in her complaint that she had
suffered loss of gross income and earning capacity as a result of
the accident. (R. 35, 47).
19.

On July 17, 1990, the Third Judicial District

Court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, entered summary
judgment in favor of defendant Guaranty, concluding in part that:
1. Plaintiff was not employed at the time
of the accident.
2. Plaintiff had not been employed for a period of
thirteen months before the accident.
3. Plaintiff presented no provable evidence that she
had eminent employment, including the following:
a. No evidence of a job offer; and
b. No evidence of hours that she would work; and
c. No evidence of wages that she would be
receiving while working; and
5

d. No detailed specific evidence that she was
seeking employment.
4. The Court concluded as a matter of law that
pursuant to the statute 31A-22-307, U.C.A., that [sic]
plaintiff must prove actual lost wages and loss of
earning capacity, The court further found that the two
prong requirement of the statute had not been met by
the plaintiff.
The court did acknowledge that
plaintiff had submitted tax records and income records
for periods in her life when she was working, but that
none of the income periods included any time within the
thirteen months before the accident.
(R.

55

Attached

as

Exhibit

"A").

Importantly,

Plaintiff

stipulated to the above factual statements of the court, which
determination

by

the

court

compelled

the

conclusion

that

Plaintiff could not prove loss of income and earning capacity.
20.
1990.

Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal on August 15,

(R. 58).
21.

On appeal, plaintiff has not disputed the trial

court's explicit conclusions

and

factual statements

plaintiff

stipulated to below regarding plaintiff's lack of evidence on the
issue of loss of income and earning capacity. (C£.,R. 55
with Appellant's brief at P. 2.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that summary judgment
was proper since plaintiff could not demonstrate actual loss of
gross income and earning capacity as required to recover benefits
under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (1986 & Supp. 1990).

6

ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE IN THIS
CASE SINCE THE FACTS TO WHICH PLAINTIFF
STIPULATED EVIDENCED THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS FOR RECOVERY.
A. Assuming The Statutory Scheme Would Allow Recovery
By Merely Showing A Loss Of Earning Capacity,
Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Given The
Stipulated Facts In This Casei

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure recognizes
that summary judgment is proper when, after reviewing relevant
pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories
and other documents, the court determines there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving part is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
Design

Corporation,

genuine issue of

657

See generally, Horaan v. Industrial

P. 2d

751

(Utah

1982)

(existence

fact does not preclude summary

of

judgment if

issues are immaterial to resolution of case); Aird Insurance
Agency v. Zions First National Bank, 612 P.2d
1980)

(motion

pleadings;

for

where

summary
facts

judgment

irrefutably

permits

341, 343 (Utah

excursion

disproved

facts

beyond
pleaded

summary judgment is appropriate); Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266
(Utah 1976) (court may look beyond motion for summary judgment in
determining appropriateness thereof).

7

In the case below, plaintiff sought to recover benefits
from Guaranty for loss of income and earning capacity she claimed
to have allegedly sustained from an automobile accident.
Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i)

(1986)(amended

Utah

1989 & 1990), x

under which plaintiff sought to recover, explicitly provides:
(1) Personal Injury
Benefits Include:

Protection

Coverages

And

(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or
85% of any loss of gross income and loss of earning
capacity per person from an inability to work, for
a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss.

Also, Utah Code Ann. S31A-22-309(5) (Supp. 1990) outlines the
procedure for the receipt of PIP benefits:
Benefits for any period are overdue if they are
not paid within 30 days after the insurer receives
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable
proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if
not paid within 30 days after that proof is
received by the insurer.
(Emphasis added).

Applying the standard for summary judgment

noted above, the trial court analyzed this statutory scheme and
granted Guaranty summary judgment after correctly concluding that
plaintiff's claim failed since, under the facts to which she
1

Subsequent amendments to this statutory chapter & section
have not changed the language or analysis of the relevant
provision.
8

stipulated, she could not demonstrate reasonable proof that she
had

suffered

both

loss of gross income and loss of earning

capacity as required by statute.
The trial court's conclusion is supported by the facts
stipulated to by the Appellant below, the plain language of the
statute, the history and intent underlying the same and sound
legal reasoning and policy; and the trial court's order should
accordingly be affirmed on appeal.
Plaintiff's primary argument on appeal is that the trial
court incorrectly ruled that summary judgment was proper since
plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that she had suffered both a
loss of gross income and a loss of earning capacity as required
for recovery of PIP benefits under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-307.
Plaintiff claims that she was only required to demonstrate a loss
of earning capacity in order to recover thereunder.

Although, as

discussed below, the subject legislation requires a showing of
both

loss of

gross

income and loss of earning capacity for

recovery of such benefits, even under plaintiff's construction of
the statutory scheme, her action fails given the facts to which
she stipulated.
In

this

regard, while

this

Court

has

not

heretofore

addressed the specific claim raised by the plaintiff, it has, by
analogy, previously considered the degree of proof necessary to
9

demonstrate

loss of earning capacity.

Truiillo, 657 P.2d

730

Indeed, in Nelson v.

(Utah, 1982), this Court considered a

negligence action, analogous to that at hand, arising out of an
automobile collision where the defendant had asserted that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could award
the plaintiff damages for the loss of future earnings.

Therein,

the trial court had instructed the jury that the plaintiff would
be entitled to an award for the present value of loss of future
earnings

if

the

jury

believed

from

a

preponderance

of

the

evidence that he was reasonably certain to suffer such loss in
the future.

In responding to defendant's motion for a new trial

on the basis that the plaintiff had provided no evidence that he
would sustain loss of future earnings as a result of his injury,
the trial court had ruled:
The defense attorney is correct in that there was
no direct evidence of dollar anticipated loss in
the future. However, plaintiff's appearance is now
abnormal. There is evidence from his mother, and
from himself, that indicates that it has definitely
affected his personality. That such an event would
occur without affecting the general lifetime
expected earnings of an individual would be
unlikely. While it is possible that the plaintiff
will find some type of endeavor that he can pursue
which will return to him the same general earnings
that he would have had had he not suffered the
injury, the court believes that the jury could well
consider that this is extremely unlikely.
Plaintiff is a college student who was injured when
he was 19 years of age.
He is now majoring in
business-type classes.
The jury could easily
10

conclude that his potential as an earner has been
substantially reduced.
Id. at 735
In addressing the issue on appeal, this Court held that
the trial court had erred in instructing the jury on the issue
since the plaintiff could point to no evidence upon which the
jury

could

realistically

assess

damages

for

future

loss of

earnings and the jury had no basis, except pure guesswork, for
estimating earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future.
Id. at 735 (citations omitted).

In short, there was no evidence

upon which the jury could reasonably base such an award.
As analogous to the case at hand, Nelson accurately sets
forth the rule that reasonable and sufficient proof or evidence
is required of a non-speculative nature before the issue of
earnings reasonably certain to be lost in the future ("earning
capacity") can be submitted to the jury.

This holding comports

with this Court's long standing recognition of the principle that
a trier of fact "should not be allowed to assess future damages
on probability, but only such damages as it believes from the
preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff will with reasonable
certainty incur in the future."
Utah 2d. 261, 409 P.2d

See Robinson v. Hreinson, 17

121, 125 (1965) (emphasis in original;

11

footnote omitted).

Damages cannot be based upon speculation,

guesswork or conjecture.
Other
necessary

in

courts
order

have

focused

to

establish

upon

the

degree

entitlement

benefits for loss of earning capacity.

to

of

proof

disability

As the Kansas Supreme

Court of Appeals noted in a case analyzing the issue of whether
an unemployed person with no past employment history and no firm
offer of future employment is entitled to disability benefits:
[T]remendous proof problems exist regarding the
amount of anticipated future earnings, where there
is no past employment record to review nor any bona
fide offer of future employment to consider.
Undoubtedly, some persons without prior working
experience and otherwise qualified might be able to
adequately demonstrate entitlement to disability
benefits. Such unemployed persons might include a
college student who anticipates employment after
the school term, a person engaged in a job
training program with placement opportunities, or a
person possessing special skills or education in
high demand in the job market at the relevant time.
•

*

*

In summary, the plaintiff in this action would be
required to prove the following to establish
entitlement to disability payments:
1. That she was unable to engage in available
and appropriate gainful employment by showing (a)
the nature and extent of her injuries; (b) her
injury was the cause of her inability to work; (c)
potential employment was accessible, obtainable and
commensurate with her skills, educational
background, work experience and any other relevant
employment criteria.
2.
That the time at which she would become
regularly employed would be within one year after
12

becoming unable to work as a result of her
injuries.
3. Since she is unable to show an actual offer
of employment, that she possess something more than
a mere hope or wish that employment will be
forthcoming, i.e., her efforts to gain employment
must reflect diligent attempts and a serious
intention to join the work force which persuades
the trier of fact that regular employment is a
reasonable expectation.
4.
A reasonable basis to calculate anticipate
future earnings must be provided, eg., the
prevailing wage and the particular employment field
being pursued, the minimum wage, etc.
See, Morgan v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 684, 689
(Kansas Ct. App. 1980). Having failed to meet such a showing, the
Kansas

Court

upheld

the

trial

court's

conclusion

that

the

plaintiff could not recover for disability benefits for loss of
future earnings, or in other words, loss of earning capacity.
In

striking

comparison

to

facts

in the

Nelson

case

previously decided by this Court and the facts determined by the
Kansas Court of Appeals in Morgan as justifying the conclusion
that loss of earning capacity could not be proven, the facts
noted by the trial court below, to which plaintiff stipulated,
likewise

demonstrate

reference

that

plaintiff

in

any reasonable, non-speculative

actually lost her capacity to earn.

this

case

failed

to

proof that she had

Indeed, plaintiff stipulated

that she had no evidence of a job offer, no evidence of hours she
worked,

no

evidence

of

wages

she

would

be

receiving

while

working, and no specific evidence that she was seeking employment
13

at the time she sought the claimed disability benefits for loss
of earning capacity.
facts

raised

in

Further, plaintiff did not dispute the

defendant's

summary

judgment

motion

that

plaintiff's doctors gave no disability or impairment ratings, nor
in most if not all instances, even opined that the injury would
be permanent or affect plaintiff's capacity to work.

And, in

comparison to criteria stressed in Morgan, plaintiff likewise
failed to demonstrate the existence of facts to show (1) the
nature and extent of her injuries; (2) that her injuries were the
cause of her inability to work; (3) that potential employment was
accessible given her background and work experience; (4) that
absent the injury she would have been regularly employed; (5)
that she had something more than a wish for employment and (6)
that she exhibited diligent attempts and an intention to join
the work force.

See id.

Instead, the facts to which plaintiff

stipulated and her employment history, including the undisputed
fact that she had been unemployed for 13 months prior to the
accident in question compelled the trial court's conclusion that,
as

in

Nelson,

there

was

no

basis,

except

pure

guesswork,

speculation or conjecture for plaintiff to claim loss of earning
capacity.

See Nelson, 657 P.2d at 735.

Accordingly, even assuming that the legislature intended
that a claimant, such as plaintiff, could recover benefits under
14

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 31A-22-307(1)(b)(i) solely by showing loss of
earning capacity without also demonstrating Actual loss of gross
income, the trial court's conclusion granting summary judgment
was appropriate in this case given the undisputed and stipulated
facts that plaintiff was clearly unable to even demonstrate a
loss of earning capacity resulting from her accident.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled
Plaintiff Could Not Demonstrate
Statutory Requisites Of Loss Of
And Earning Capacity to Recover
Under Utah Law.

That
Both The
Income
Benefits

In addition to claiming that she was entitled to benefits
under Utah Code Ann §31A-22-307, merely by claiming an alleged
loss of earning capacity as a result of the accident, plaintiff
also urges on appeal that the trial court incorrectly ruled that
her claim failed since she could not demonstrate that she had
suffered both loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity
as required by statute.
As this Court has repeatedly held, a statute should be
applied

according

to

its

literal

wording

unless

it

is

unreasonably confused or inoperable; and it must be assumed that
each term in a statute was used advisably by the legislature and
that each should be interpreted and applied according to its
usually accepted meaning and in harmony with the other provisions
15

within an Act since it is not the duty of the courts to assess
the wisdom of a statutory scheme. See,

West Jordan v. Morrison,

656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982).
Applying these principles to the case at hand, a plain
reading of the relevant statutes noted above required that the
plaintiff in this case demonstrate reasonable proof of actual
"loss of gross income" and, in addition to, "loss of earning
capacity" before she could receive any benefits thereunder.

In

order to determine whether genuine facts existed as to the issue
of plaintiff's potential recovery for loss of gross income and
earning

capacity, the court

considered the above-noted

facts

plaintiff stipulated to at oral argument below, and concluded
that, notwithstanding the fact plaintiff had plead that she had
allegedly

provided

defendant

reasonable

proof

of

plaintiff's

inability to work, summary judgment against the plaintiff was
appropriate

because

according

to plaintiff's

own account and

testimony: (1) she was not receiving any income at the time of
her accident;

(2) she had not been employed for at least 13

months prior thereto; (3) she had not even substantially looked
for work
provide

for approximately two years; and
evidentiary

support

(4) she could not

for the allegation

physically unable to work. (R. 21-22, 42).
suffered no loss of income.
16

that

she was

In short, she had

Accordingly, inasmuch as a plain reading of the applicable
statutes clearly require that plaintiff must provide reasonable
proof of a loss of gross income in order to receive disability
loss of income and loss of earning capacity benefits and since
the

facts

stipulated

to

by

plaintiff

in

this

case

clearly

demonstrate that she could not meet this proof as there was no
evidence that she was receiving any income at the time of the
incident nor that she had been employed or even looked for work
for over a year prior thereto, the trial court correctly ruled
that plaintiff would not be entitled to the claimed benefits and
summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law.
C. Summary Judgment Was Appropriate In This Case
Since The Legislature Clearly Intended To Deny
Benefits For Loss Of Earning Capacity When There
Was No Reasonable Proof That Plaintiff Would Be
Entitled To The Same.
Finally, plaintiff's simple "mathematical computation" set
forth in her appellate brief, while interestingly novel, in no
way

reflects

the

policy

underlying

Utah

Code Ann. §31A-22-

307(1)(b)(i), application of which, in addition to the plain
language of the subject legislation, compels the conclusion that
the

trial

plaintiff

court
urges

correctly
this

court

ruled
to

below.

read

the

Indeed,
word

although

"and"

as

a

"computational" term in the statutory phrase, "gross income and
loss of earning capacity," the history of and intent underlying
17

the statute clearly demonstrates that the legislature carefully
chose the term "gross income and loss of earning capacity" in
order to avoid meritless claims by limiting recovery under the
No-Fault Act only to cases where there is both a loss of gross
income and a loss of earning capacity•
In this regard, Utah Code Ann- § 31-41-2 (1973), although
repealed in 1985, emphasizes the policy underlying Utah's NoFault

Act.

procedures

When
and

the

details

act
of

was
the

overhauled
same

in

1985

were modified,

specific
but

the

substantial purpose underlying the legislation was not changed:
The intention of the legislature is hereby to
possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain
savings in, the rising costs of automobile
accident insurance and to effectuate a more
efficient, equitable method of handling the
greater bulk of the personal injury claims that
arise out of automobile accidents, these being
those not involving great amounts of damages.
(See Exhibit B ) .
This Court has emphasized this essential policy in a case
analogous to that at hand.

In Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins.

Co., 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977), the plaintiff had contended that a
twelve-year-old boy was entitled to benefits under the household
services provision of the no-fault act simply because, under a
technical

and

theoretically

imaginative
unable

reading

of

the

statute,

to perform minor household

he

chores after

being injured by an automobile while riding his bicycle.
18

was

In

denying the plaintiff

recovery, this Court stressed that the

interpretation and application of law should not be a process of
technical or

computational application, but rather a process of

considered rational reasoning.

Accordingly:

[t]he principle which best serves the objective
to be desired is to give both parties the benefit
of a sensible, even-handed
and practical
application of the statute, under the assumption
that all of its language was used advisedly and in
harmony with its purposes. If the Act had intended
reimbursement for any and all duties performed by
members of households, it could have been plainly
so stated. But it does not do so. Only by keeping
the awards within reason, and excepting therefrom
claims that might be unrealistic, fanciful, or
perhaps even fraudulent, can the stated objective,
"to effectuate . . . savings in the rising costs of
automobile
accident
insurance
. . . " be
accomplished.
Otherwise it is obvious that
necessary increases in premiums would defeat,
rather than promote the purposes of the Act.
Id.

at

9 60

original).

(footnotes

omitted;

emphasis

and

ellipsis

in

Thereafter, this Court applied the purpose of the no-

fault insurance act to the statute analogous to that at hand and
concluded:
[I]t becomes plain that the Act both in its
statement of general purpose and its specific
provisions, was not intended to provide an
automatic reward or a "windfall," for being
involved in an accident by requiring payment when
there was no loss actually suffered, nor for any
expense not reasonably to be incurred, but should
be construed in conformity with the fundamental
principle of insurance law, that the purpose of
insurance is to indemnify for losses or damages
suffered, as contrasted to gambling for a
munificent reward if a loss occurs.
19

Id. at 960-961

(footnotes omitted; emphasis added); see also,

Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 P.2d 609, 612 (Utah, 1979)
(No-Fault

Insurance

Act

was

never

intended

to

give

injured

plaintiff windfall or extra income as benefit for having had
accident).
In addition, commensurate with the standard in Utah Code
Ann.
proof"

§

31A-22-309(5)(Supp.1991),
of

loss

of

income

be

requiring

produced

that

requisite

"reasonable
to

any PIP

benefits being paid, this Court added:
[I]t is also pertinent to observe that the
general rule is that an award of damages cannot
properly be made on mere possibility or conjecture,
there must be a firmer foundation. That is, any
such award must be supported by proof upon which
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon, could
believe that it is more probable than not, that
damage was actually suffered.
Id. at 961-962 (footnote omitted).
Applying

herein

this

Court's

analyses

and

holding

in

Jamison that (1) proof of damages meriting PIP benefits must be
made upon firm foundation (2) losses must actually be suffered
before PIP benefits are appropriate bases for recovery; and (3)
had the legislature intended to provide for the relief plaintiff

20

seeks

it

could

have

so

stated2, compel

the conclusion

that

section 31A-22-307 must likewise be read to require reasonable
proof of both actual loss of income and loss of earning capacity
before recovery is appropriate thereunder•
constitutes

a

necessary

but

Either element alone

insufficient

condition

for

the

payment of PIP benefits, which, if paid out as plaintiff urges,
would

negate

the

sensible

and

evenhanded

purpose

of

the

legislation while allowing for unrealistic and fanciful claims
based upon "mere possibility or conjecture"<

Jamison, 559 P.2d

at 961-62.
Application of the Jamison principles to the facts of the
instant

case

legislative

also

scheme

decision below*

demonstrates

the

and the correctness

reasonableness
of the trial

of

the

court's

Here, the facts to which plaintiff stipulated

compelled the conclusion that plaintiff had no reasonable proof
of loss of actual income.
earning capacity was

also

As noted above, her claim of loss of
tentative at best.

1

Thus, it was

Had the legislature intended that an unemployed claimant
could recover benefits under Utah Code Ann. 3lA-22-307(l)(b)(i)
by merely showing only a loss of earning capacity without also
showing a loss of income, it would have expressly so provided as
have other states. See, e.g. Marryshow v. Nationwide Mutual Ins.
Co. , 452 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. 1982). (statute provided for
benefits for victims who were not employed when accident
resulting in injury occurred); Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Auto
Ins. Co., 613 P.2d 684 (Kansas Ct. App. 1980) (applying statutory
scheme explicitly addressing unemployed persons).
21

questionable

whether

plaintiff

met

either

of

the

conditions

required for PIP benefits, let alone both criterion.
Nevertheless,

plaintiff

implicitly

attempted

to

argue

that since she had begun to search for a job after years of
unemployment and since she had worked for two days after the
accident that somehow she should receive benefits for that work
which she would have theoretically done had she not been injured.
As noted above, the statutory scheme does not provide for such
eventualities and for an "automatic reward" or a 'windfall' for
being involved in an accident" when there is no loss actually
suffered.

See

id.

The

statutory

scheme

further

requires

reasonable proof of loss, of which none has been provided. See,
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(5) .

The general rule of damages is

that the plaintiff must provide proof of damage; damages cannot
be based upon possibility or conjecture.
Accordingly, since plaintiff provided no reasonable proof
to show actual loss of gross income the trial court correctly
ruled

that

she

could

not

recover

any

benefits

under

the

applicable statute 3 and its order should be affirmed on appeal.

J

The cases are distinguishable that appellant cites in
support of her claim.
See e.g. Marrvshow v. Nationwide Mutual
Ins. Co., 452 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. 1982); Minier v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. , 454 A.2d 1078 (Pa. Super. 1982).
(statute provided for benefits for victims who were not employed
when accident resulting in injury occurred).
22

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly ruled that summary judgment was
appropriate in this case inasmuch as plaintiff failed to comply
with the no-fault statutory requirement that a reasonable showing
of

loss

of

disability

income must
benefits

and

be made
since

requisite

plaintiff

to obtaining

failed

to

any

otherwise

demonstrate a loss of earning capacity as required by law.

The

trial court's conclusion should be affirmed in all respects.
DATED this

(4

day of March, 1991.
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

THEODORE E." KANELlT^
f\
W
JARYL L. RENCHER
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that four true and correct copies of
this Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following on this
l ^ ^ d a y of March, 1991.
Robert Breeze
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
230 East 300 South, #215
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Exhibit "A" - Order on Summary Judgments, dated July 17, 1990
Exhibit "B" - §31-41-2, Utah Code Ann.

EXHIBIT "A"

JUL

i? m

THEODORE E. KANELL (1768)
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorney for Defendant
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLENDA VERSLUIS,

*

ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

*

Plaintiff,
vs.
GUARANTY NATIONAL COMPANIES,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*

Judge Pat B. Brian
Civil No.: 900900964PI

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
pursuant to the joint request of both parties for oral arguments
on the cross-motions for summary judgment on the 2"2nd" day of"
June, 1990, at 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian.
Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel of record, Robert B.
Breeze and Defendant appeared by and through counsel of record,
Theodore E. Kanell.

The Court after reviewing all memoranda,

pleadings and depositions, heard arguments of counsel.

The Court

after being fully apprised in the premises and after hearing all
that was presented by the parties denied Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment and granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Court based its' rulings on the following findings:

1.

Plaintiff was not employed at the time of the

accident•
2. Plaintiff had not been employed

for a period of

thirteen months before the accident*
3 • Plaintiff presented no provable evidence that she
had eminent employment, including the following:
a.

No evidence of a job offer; and

b.

No evidence of hours that she would work; and

c.

No

evidence

of wages

that

she would

be

receiving while working; and
d.

No detailed specific evidence that she was

seeking employment.
4. The Court concluded as a matter of law that pursuant
to the
actual

statute

31A-22-307, U-C.A. that Plaintiff must

lost wages

and

loss of earning capacity.

prove

The Court

further found that the two prong requirement of the statute had
not been met by the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff

had

submitted

tax

The Court did acknowledge that
records

and

income

records

for

periods in her life when she was working, but that none of the
income periods

included

any time within

the thirteen

months

before the accident.
Based upon the foregoing,

the Court hereby denies

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and grants Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment, each party to bear their own costs
and attorney's fees.
/7

DATED THIS

day of _ ^/^,

J?^/

, 1990.

HONORABLE PAT B. ^BR-IAJT
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approval as to Form:

^2:

7-Yj5-^

ROBERT B. BREEZE
Attorney for Plaintiff

THEODORE E. KANELL
<AttC
/Attorney
for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

&/

-£. day

of June,

1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Mr. Robert Breeze
Attorney for Plaintiff
211 East 300 South, #215
Salt Lakfe City, Utah 84111

EXHIBIT "B"

APPENDIX

31-41-2

"A"

INSURANCE

elude: Colorado, Connecticut, Dc lawn re,
Florida, Georgia. Hawaii, Kansas, Kentueky, Maryland. Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Xcvada, Xew Jersey, New
York. Orrcon. Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico
and South Carolina.
Cross-Reference.
S
Safety Responsibility Act. 14-12-1 ct

Law Beviews.
Xo-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
LO Rex. 248.
Compensation Systems and Utah's Nop a u j t Statute, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383.
Countrywide Overview of Automobile
No-Fault" Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443
(1974).

scq

31-41-2. Purpose of act—Property damage claims not affected.—The
purpose of this act is to require the payment of certain prescribed benefits
in respect to motor vehicle accidents through either insurance or other
approved security but on the basis of no fault preserving, however, the
right of an injured person to pursue the customary tort claims where the
most serious types of injuries occur. The intention of the legislature is
hereby to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings in, the rising
costs of automobile accident insurance and to effectuate a more efficient,
equitable method of handling the greater bulk of the personal injury
claims that arise out of automobile accidents, these being those not involving great amounts of damages. This act is not designed to have any effect
on property damage claims.
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 2.
_ mm
m _
CoUateral References.
Insurance€=H.l.
44 CJT.S. Insurance § 64.

Scfe Am. Jur. 2d. No-Fault Insurance
§§ 1-34, when published.
**
Validity and construction of "no-fault"
automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R. 3d
229.

31-41-3. Definition of terms.—As used in this act:
(1) "Motor vehicle" means any vehicle of a kind required to be
registered under Title 41, but excluding, however motorcycles.
(2) "Person'* includes every natural person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, or any governmental entity, or agency of it.
(3) "Owner*" means a person who holds the legal title to a motor
vehicle, or in the event a motor vehicle is the subject of a security agreement or lease with option to purchase with the debtor or lessee having the
right to possession, then the debtor or lessee shall be deemed the owner for
purposes of this act.
(4) "Insured" means the named insured, the spouse or other relative
of the named insured who reside in the same household as the named insured, including those who usually make their home in the same household
but temporarily live elsewhere, or any person using the described motor
vehicle with the permission, either expressed or implied, of the owner.
(5) "Occupying" means being in or upon a motor vehicle as a passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate acts of entering, boarding,
or alighting from a motor vehicle.
(6) "Pedestrian" means any natural person not occupying or riding
upon a motor vehicle.
(7) "Department" means the Utah insurance department.
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 3.
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31-41-6

INSURANCE

31-41-6. Minimum benefits —* Determination of reasonable value of
medical expenses—Medical expenses include nonmedical remedial caxe and
treatment in accordance with religious method—Deductible amounts aL
lowed.—(1) Every insurance policy or other security complying with the
requirements of subsection (1) of section 31-41-5 shall provide personal
injury protection providing for payments to the insured and to all other
persons suffering personal injury arising out of an accident involving any
motor vehicle, except as otherwise provided in this act, in at least the
following minimum amounts:
fa) Medical benefits: the reasonable value of all expenses for necessary
medical, surgical, X-ray, dental, and rehabilitation services, including
prosthetic devices, necessary ambulance, hospital, and nursing services
not to exceed a total of $2,000 per person, as determined under subsection
(2) of this section.
(b) Disability benefits: (i) 85% of any loss of gross income and loss
of earning capacity per person from inability to work during a period
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and continuing for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks thereafter, not to exceed a
total of $150 per week, but if the person's inability to work shall so continue for in excess of a total of two consecutive weeks after the date of
the injury, this three-day elimination period shall not be applicable; and
fii) in lieu of reimbursement for expenses which would have been reasonably incurred for services that, but for the injury, the injured person
would have performed for his household and regardless of whether any
of these expenses are actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per day
commencing not later than three days after the date of the injury and
continuing for a maximum of 365 days thereafter, but if the person's inability to perform these services shall so continue for in excess of a total
of fourteen days after the date of the injury, this three-day elimination
period shall #ot be applicable.
(c) Funeral benefits: funeral, burial, or cremation benefits not to
exceed a total of $1,000 per person.
(d) Survivor benefits*: compensation on account of death of a person,
payable to his heirs, in the total of $2,000.
(2) To determine the reasonable value of the medical expenses provided for in subsection (1) of this section and in subsection (1) (e) of
section 31-41-9, the department shall conduct a relative value study of
services and accommodations for the diagnosis, care, recovery, or rehabilitation of an injured person in the most populous county in the state for
the purpose of assigning: a unit value and median charge to each type of
service and accommodation. In conducting the study, the department
shall consult with appropriate public and private medical and health
agencies. Upon completion of the study, the department shall prepare and
publish a relative value study which sets forth the unit value and median
charge assigned to each type of service and accommodation. The value of
any service or accommodation shall be determined by applying the unit
value and median charge assigned to the service or accommodation under
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31-41-7

the relative value study. If a service or accommodation is not assigned a
unit value or median charge under the relative value study, the value of
the service or accommodation shall equal the reasonable cost of the same
«>r similar service or accommodation in the most populous county of this
state. Nothing herein shall preclude the department from adopting a schedule already established if it meets the requirement of this subsection. In
deputed cases, a court on its own motion or the motion of either party
may designate an impartial medical panel of not more than three licensed
physicians to examine the claimant and testify on the issue of the reasonable value of their medical expenses.
(3) Medical expenses as provided for in subsection (1) of this section
and in subsection (1) (e) of section 31-41-9 shall include expenses for any
nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with a
recognized religious method of healing.
(4) At appropriately reduced premium rates insurers may offer deductibles in amounts not exceeding $500 per accident in respect to the
• nsurance coverages required by this act applicable, however, only to
••aims of the insured.
[o) Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prohibit an
insurance policy from providing coverage for any nonmedical remedial
treatment rendered in accordance with a recognized religious method of
healing.
,
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 6.
CoUateral Eeferences.
lnsuranceC=»ll.l.

44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
7 Am. Jur. 2d 298, Automobile Insurance § ^
|

31-41-7. Personal injuries covered—Primary coverage—Reduction of
benefits.—(1) The coverages described in section 31-41-6 shall be applicable to-.
(a) Personal injuries sustained by the insured when injured in an
accident in this state involving any motor vehicle.
(b) Personal injuries arising out of automobile accidents occurring
in this state sustained by any other natural person while occupying the
described motor vehicle with the consent of the insured or while a pedestrian if injured in an accident involving the described motor vehicle.
(2) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other
policy, including those complying with this act, primary coverage shall
:v afforded by the policy insuring the motor vehicle out of the use of
which the accident arose.
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under section 31-41-6
^liall be reduced b y :
(a) Any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive
as a result of an accident covered in this act under any workmen's compensation plan or any similar statutory plan; and
(b) Any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive
from the United States or any of its agencies because of military enlistment, duty or service.
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INSURANCE

History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 7.

44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
7 Am. Jur« 2d 298, Automobile Insur~
a n c e § ge

CoUateral References*
Insurance^»ll.L

31-41-8. Payment of benefits—Time limit—Action for overdue beneflti
and interest.—Payment of the benefits provided for in section 31-41-6 shall
be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any
period are overdue if not paid within 35 days after the insurer receives
reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses incurred during the
period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 35
days after such proof is received by the insurer. Any part or all of the
remainder of the claim that is later supported by reasonable proof is also
overdue if not paid within 35 days after such proof is received by the
insurer. In the event the insurer fails to pay such expenses when due, the
amount of these expenses shall bear interest at the rate of 1^4% per month
after the due date, and the person entitled to such benefits may bring an
action in contract to recover these expenses plus the applicable interest.
If the insurer is required by such action to pay any overdue benefits and
interest, the insurer shall also be required to pay reasonable attorney's
fees to the claimant.
History: L. 1973, CIL 55, § 8.

46 GJ.S. Insurance § 1407.
44 Am. Jur. 2d 718, Insurance § 1798.

CoUateral References,
Insurance©»675.

31-41-9. Limitations on tort actions—Liability of non-covered owner.—
(1) No person for whom direct benefit coverage is provided for in this
act shall be allowed to maintain a cause of action for general damages
arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been caused by an automobile accident except where there has been caused by this accident any
one or more of the following:
(a) Death;
(b) Dismemberment or fracture;
(c) Permanent disability;
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or
(e) Medical expenses to a person in excess of $500.
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle with respect to %vhich security is
required by this act who fails to have such security in effect at the time
of an accident shall have no immunity from tort liability and shall be
personally liable for the payment of the benefits provided for under section
31-41-6.
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 9.
CoUateral References.
InsuranceC=>4.,l.
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64.
See Am. Jur. 2d, No-Fault Insurance
§§ 1-34, when published.
.
Validity and construction of "no-fault"

automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. B.
3d 229.
L

* w Baviews.
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
L. Rev. 248.
Countrywide Overview of Automobile
No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443
(1974).
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